The visit of the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus on Tuesday the 9th, analyzes, mainly from outside the region, that there is a (comprehensive Arab reassessment of the reality of relations with Syria and its relevance to the fight against terrorism in the Region as well as the importance of the current Syrian reality in the calculations of the Arab and Gulf states) comes security, especially vis-Ã -vis Iran, and breaking the American “Caesar Law” to impose an economic blockade on Syria) and have various analyzes and speculations about their future increased. The Emirati move, its impact and dimensions in Arab and Gulf relations with the Syrian regime and whether it is one of the indicators for the transition to another new phase of political action to open up to Damascus and the return of Syria to its regional and international role. Especially with the clarification of the “Emirati-Syrian coordination” some time before this visit, in order to arrange rapprochement between the two sides, through the announcement of the contact between the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and President Bashar Al-Assad ) as well as an official invitation to Syria to participate in the “International Expo Exhibition In Dubai” and then my meeting with the Syrian and emirate oil ministers in Moscow.
But what stopped me on this Emirates visit were perhaps other events that were not addressed in these analyzes, that caught my attention analytically and scientifically, and were the most varied of them (I was made aware of this by a foreign researcher while I was commenting on it made analysis that the move of the Emirates is mainly in the interests of Tehran of the Iranian regime, not to stifle and besiege Iran in its areas of influence and its known role in Syria). Despite the weirdness of this analysis, I looked at another question in order to answer it: (The importance of the Israeli Mossad chief’s visit to Bahrain and Emirates officialsâs visit to Tel Aviv and what is it? Even more evident to the public is the organization of joint naval exercises in the Red Sea with the joint Israeli naval forces with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) at the same time as the aforementioned visit.
Accordingly, my analysis mainly focuses on whether this visit is by (arranging and coordinating with Tel Aviv to contain Iran in Syria and the region by pulling Syria back into the Arab League and collective Arab action) and the Gulf rejecters and the Arab reservations took place on the step of rapprochement. The Syrian-Iranian, or rather, I was aiming for a clearer Gulf rapprochement with Iran through rapprochement with Syria, when I went to a series of mainly Western analyzes that I received. From here, the Egyptian researcher analyzes all of the following elements:
Analysis of the impact of the visit of the Foreign Minister of the UAE (Bin Zayed) to Syria on November 9, 2021.
And his relationship to the “joint naval maneuvers” between (Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) in the Red Sea on November 10, 2021 about the Iranian existence in Syria
The visit of (the head of the Israeli secret service Mossad in Bahrain) on the occasion of the joint naval maneuvers with Israel in the Red Sea, with (the visit of the commander of the air force of the United Arab Emirates in Israel).
Then, finally, the analysis of the impact of the Israeli intelligence movements of the Mossad in the Red Sea on their rapprochement with the United States (China, Russia and Iran).
To answer these questions it is necessary to review and answer the number of requests and some other different analyzes, such as:
The UAE’s motives for such a step towards rapprochement with Syria through the visit of the UAE Foreign Minister âSheikh Abdullah bin Zayedâ to Damascus on Tuesday, November 9th, 2021, and the meeting with the Syrian President âBashar Al-Assadâ.
Will this move by the Emirates (encourage the rest of the Arab countries to follow in the Emirates’ footsteps) and open up to the Syrian regime?
What is the fate of the “Syrian opposition to the Emirati-Syrian rapprochement”, and is this step by the Emirates aimed at weakening the Syrian opposition, especially the Syrians who are abroad against the regime of President “Bashar Al-Assad” place?
Then it remains to analyze (the options of the Syrian opposition if more Arab countries open up to the Al-Assad regime).
Will there be a (Syrian-Emirati consensus) for the solution step (return of Syrian refugees from abroad and settlement of their situation with the current Syrian regime)?
Finally, the question arises regarding: (the impact of the intensity of American and international criticism of the step of rapprochement between the UAE and the Syrian regime and President “Bashar Al-Assad” on the completion of the remaining Arab steps towards integration and return to Syria again Membership in the League of Arab States)?
In fact, the most dangerous and important analysis for me remains completely analytical, namely: (What was put forward about the fact that the UAE received the green light from the United States of America itself and from Israeli Minister “Bin Zayed” in the Emirates, in order to form a (Gulf-UAE-Israeli alliance against Iran) and to neutralize the Syrian regime in view of these Iranian steps as a closely related ally of the Iranians?) that we can analyze as follows:
Perhaps reinforces and supports my recent view on the “Israeli Gulf mobilization with the help of the UAE and Washington’s assistance to confront Iran through Syria” (the joint security coordination between Israel and the Emirati and Bahraini naval forces to carry out joint sea maneuvers in the Red Sea, the five lasted full days), which took place on Wednesday the 10th
(There are joint security arrangements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in the face of Iran by moving closer to Syria as an ally of Iran.)
As mentioned earlier, the joint naval maneuvers between Israel and the United Arab Emirates confirm concurrently with the visit to the United Arab Emirates (the continuation of the joint security coordination between Israel and the United Arab Emirates), in particular to contain and limit Iranian influence. Knowing that the step of joint security coordination between the Emirates and Israel began three years ago when the naval forces of the Gulf States, mainly the âUAE and Bahrainâ, began to conduct joint sea maneuvers with the Israeli side, which are always the first for them with its Israeli counterpart in collaboration with the United States Navy Armed Forces.
We note that the current joint naval maneuvers in the Red Sea with the participation of the United Arab Emirates and Israel with the participation of (warships from the Emirates, Bahrain and Israel) alongside the United States of America make a “joint Israeli” golf claim “, to send a message to the Iranian side that these naval maneuvers with Israel are aimed at:
“Securing maritime traffic in the face of Iran and striving to secure the movement of the straits and shipping in the Red Sea with the help of Israeli security, in particular that these joint maritime training operations included training in encirclement and raid tactics.”
This was confirmed by the US Naval Forces Central Command in an official statement to confirm the following:
“The training in Israel, the Emirates and Bahrain aims to improve the ability to work collectively among the forces participating in the maneuvers.”
From here we understand that the step of joint Israeli-Emirati security coordination and the subsequent step of joint naval maneuvers after the signing of the “Abraham Agreement” in September 2020 and the normalization of their relations with Israel by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Since then, it has strengthened (diplomatic, military and intelligence relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as the two main Gulf states sharing Tel Aviv’s concerns about Iranian activities in the Red Sea and the region).
The most prominent here is (the visit of the head of the Israeli secret service Mossad on a public visit to Bahrain on the occasion of the joint naval maneuvers with Israel in the Red Sea, with the commander of the air force of the United Arab Emirates on the same time during a first visit to Israel in October 2021).
Generally speaking, the (reopening of the Emirati and Bahraini embassies in Damascus) in December 2018 was seen as (a major change in Gulf policy towards Syria and was one of the first signs of a broader normalization). There is no doubt that these steps were taken after consulting with Saudi Arabia. However, for fear of the “relations of the al-Assad regime with Tehran”, Saudi Arabia seems to be taking a cautious and discreet stance towards rapprochement with Syria as usual.
At that time, the UAE and Bahrain were talking about (the geopolitical benefits of rehabilitating President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime). The state of Bahrain confirmed that “the step of integration by Bashar Al-Assad aims to strengthen the Arab role and prevent regional interference in Syrian affairs”.
The main analytical question for me is whether Abu Dhabi has completely severed its relations with Damascus at all, given the continued presence of prominent Syrian figures who live and work in the Emirates.
In general, this (continuous stream of signals from Damascus and other Arab capitals led by the Emirates to move closer to Syria) suggests that the Syrian government’s former opponents were on the verge of reaching mutually beneficial agreements with the Syrian government , some of whom a few years ago promised to drop it.
The main gains for the Syrian regime from this rapprochement with the UAE and the rest of the Arab countries will be (construction treaties for Syria and energy agreements), in addition to the markets that will be opened for it when they reconcile with the Arab countries could later pave the way for the “resumption of Damascus and the return of its membership in the League of Arab States”, which is of course the most important strategic step for the UAE and the Gulf States to help Syria return to the “Arab House” and consequently put pressure not to move closer to Iran as it is a rival opponent of the UAE and the Gulf States.
In this regard, the Syrian capital Damascus is now hoping for (influential Arab voices to exert international pressure to lift the harsh sanctions against the Syrian regime) aimed at (Syrian officials and Syrian organizations for their alleged involvement in human rights abuses).